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Abstract: The standard conception of legal ethics, based on the prin-
ciples of partisanship and neutrality, affirms that lawyers must adopt a 
specific attitude towards their client’s cause. The paper identifies and 
explores three main factors that have contributed to the success of this 
conception. Firstly, state-centred legal positivism as the dominant para-
digm in contemporary Western legal theory. Secondly, the adversarial 
context, presumed to be the environment where lawyers typically perform 
their function as professionals. Thirdly, the agency model as a metaphor 
describing the relations between lawyers (agents) and their clients (prin-
cipals). As all these elements carry with them problems of their own, this 
paper concludes by highlighting the limits of “amorality” as a general 
theory of legal ethics. Although moral neutrality is probably a justifiable 
position for the criminal defendant, it is difficult to extend its justifica-
tory scope to many other areas of legal practice, especially in a globalised 
post-Westphalian world where lawyers typically act in ways that escape 
the traditional legal monopoly of the nation-state.
Keywords: legal ethics; theory of “amorality”; legal positivism; ad-
versarialism; agency theory; globalisation.
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“No social role encourages such ambitious moral aspirations as the 
lawyer’s, and no social role so consistently disappoints the aspirations it 
encourages.”
William Simon
THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF LEGAL ETHICS
By definition, lawyers occupy a difficult moral position. They re- 
present the interests of their clients, thus fulfilling a partisan role, but 
they do so within the context of a system of administration of justice 
that aims at higher communal values.1 The lawyer serves two masters 
that may have demands. Indeed, the interest of the client will often 
confront the general interest of the system. As a consequence, the law-
yer is placed in a perpetual dilemma, between two potentially opposing 
ethical loyalties (La Torre, 2003). Deontological codes in different ju-
risdictions reflect this essential ambiguity (e.g. Zacharias, 2007; La 
Torre, 2003; O’Dair, 2001).
It is in this context that the so-called amorality theory has become the 
standard conception of legal ethics (e.g., O’Dair, 2001). According to 
this dominant view, the work of the lawyer must be determined by two 
main principles:
– the principle of partisanship, according to which lawyers must 
zealously defend the interests of their client, everything that is not 
technically illegal in order to further these interests, even when the 
result clearly thwarts the aims of substantive law.
– the principle of neutrality, according to which lawyers must repre-
sent their client regardless of their own view on the justice of the 
cause, and are consequently absolved of any moral responsibility 
for acts done in the name of the client.2
1 In this paper I will deal with lawyers as “private attorneys”, rather than other 
legal professionals such as judges, public officers, law professors, and so on. This is 
justified by the fact that private attorneys typically face more serious and frequent 
ethical dilemmas than other legal professionals. This is also the reason why they receive 
most of the attention in legal ethics literature.
2 The second part of the sentence can be considered a third principle in its own 
right: the principle of non-accountability (Wendel, 2010, p. 29).
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Although the standard conception is criticised by many, its prevalence 
within the legal profession is unanimously accepted in legal ethics litera-
ture. Of course, it is not plausible to believe that most practicing lawyers 
have undergone a conscious process of academic-like reflection in order 
to construct an apologetic theory for their professional behaviour, but 
we can still identify the prevalence of the standard conception in what 
has been called the lawyers’ “working philosophies” (Simon, 1998, p. 
100). This conclusion is indeed backed by social scientific evidence (Wen-
del, 2010, p. 30).
It is crucial to understand that the standard conception is intrinsically 
normative rather than descriptive; it prescribes that lawyers must be 
amoral as regards to the goals pursued by their clients and the means to 
achieve them (Wasserstrom, 1975). The theory is frequently misunder-
stood as if it displayed lawyers’ lack of interest for moral matters. In fact, 
the amorality theory claims that by being morally neutral the lawyer 
achieves moral righteousness. The subtlety of this idea is captured in the 
expression “moral amorality” (La Torre, 2009, p. 16).3
The paradoxical nature of the term “moral amorality” can be cla-
rified by the concept of “role morality”. The argument for the 
amoral role of the lawyer begins by conceiving the administration of 
justice as a collective task in which every participant has to play a 
role (Kipnis, 1991). Different roles imply different responsibilities, 
and as much as a judge should not behave as an attorney-at law, at-
torneys should not behave as judges of their client’s cause. Moral 
neutrality on the part of the attorney enables a better legal defence 
for the citizen and client. According to the conception of the legal 
process that is shared in its basic tenets throughout the Western world, 
justice is best achieved by the confrontation of two opposing parties 
in front of an impartial third party – the decision making judge or 
arbiter. In this context, “the lawyer who refuses giving professional 
assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, 
assumes the functions of both judge and jury” (Sharswood, quoted in 
Luban, 1988, p. 10).
3 Difficulties in understanding this subtlety, or maybe the hypocritical use that 
lawyers have often made of it, may explain why they have been so frequently described 
as despicable in Western literature, philosophy, and popular culture. There are hundreds 
of examples frequently referred to in legal ethics literature, ranging from Plato to 
Luther and from Shakespeare to modern TV shows.
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The alternative to this theory would be to affirm some sort of moral 
activism on the part of the lawyer. This would imply that lawyers act as 
a moral screen, inasmuch as they evaluate their client’s cause in terms of 
conventional morals and so allowing their professional behaviour to be 
determined by this evaluation (in what may be detrimental to the prin-
ciple of partisanship). According to one of the main advocates for amoral-
ity, this type of behaviour would ultimately endanger the fundamental 
political values of autonomy and equality (Pepper, 1986). People would 
not only see their access to law curtailed, but since we must assume that 
different lawyers hold different moral views, the degree of the access to 
law would differ depending on the particular lawyer that each citizen 
chooses or can afford. Thus, when looking at the big picture it is likely 
that by adopting a morally neutral position, the lawyer is contributing 
to the realisation of justice according to law, that is, within the mindset 
of liberal political principles.
This way of thinking is closely connected to political philosophy, since 
it is based on the justification of particular institutions, namely, the legal 
system and the system of administration of justice (Wendel, 2010). Some 
advocates for amorality suggest a pragmatic justification of these institu-
tions, based on the fact that there is nothing better in sight (Kipnis, 1991), 
whereas others try a more principled justification, such as Pepper’s “first 
class citizenship model” based on the above men tioned political values of 
autonomy and equality (Pepper, 1986). But every version of the amoral-
ity theory, independently of the justification that it provides for the legal 
system, shares the belief that lawyers must not let their personal moral 
views interfere with their job if they want to fulfil the responsibilities 
attached to their role. Thus, for example, the lawyer-client privilege (duty 
of confidentiality) imposes on the professional the obligation not to dis-
close any information learnt from the client even when private morality 
urges to disclose the information. The hidden rationale is that without 
this privilege the client would not reveal all relevant information to the 
lawyer, and this would prevent lawyers from performing at their best 
when defending their client’s interests, so that ultimately the search for 
a fair legal outcome would be hindered (Kipnis, 1991).
The idea of role morality is controversial in itself. Thus, for example, 
La Torre draws on Kant’s principle of universalizability to conclude that 
there is no such thing, since we cannot rationally expect the specific duties 
attached to a particular occupation to be universally extended to other 
roles (La Torre, 2003; but cf Luban, 1988, pp. 113-15). I will not con-
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sider here the philosophical merits of this argument, but in any case most 
of the literature in the field accepts “role-morality” as a legitimate notion, 
to the extent that “the fundamental question in theoretical legal ethics is 
often described as the problem of “role-differentiated morality” (Wendel, 
2010, p.20). There is a general agreement that “lawyers are ... subject in 
their professional lives to a role morality which permits and indeed often 
requires them to do things that they (and others) would regard as im-
moral in their private life” (O’Dair, 2001, p. 134). Without this dual 
level of potentially conflicting moralities, the whole field of legal ethics 
would either collapse into the broader field of general morals, or be lim-
ited to the rather uninteresting activity of ascertaining the deontological 
black-letter rules that lawyers should follow. It is in the conflict between 
role morality and ordinary morals that legal ethics becomes challenging 
both from a theoretical and a practical point of view (Kirkland, 2007).
In this paper I sustain that the success of the amorality theory can be 
explained by three factors that are both cultural and historical (i) the 
prominence of legal positivism as a philosophy of law; (ii) the idea that 
the essential task of lawyers is defending their clients’ interests in a court 
of law; and (iii) the view of the lawyer-client relationship through the 
lense of the agency model. In the following sections, I will analyse these 
elements one by one, explaining how they contribute to the dominance 
of the amorality theory, but at the same time, highlighting how the 
problems posed by these elements ultimately question the adequacy of 
the standard conception of legal ethics.
LEGAL POSITIVISM
State-centred positivism has been the dominant paradigm in Western 
contemporary legal thought at least since the beginning of the 19th cen-
tury.4 There are two ways in which positivism has contributed to the 
success of the amorality theory.
4 Conventionally, the theory goes simply by the name of “legal” positivism, but I 
find the term “state-centered” positivism more pertinent, since it adds an important 
element: the consideration of state law as the only valid source of law, as opposed to 
legal pluralism (Scott, 2009). This specific point becomes especially relevant in the age 
of globalisation, at a time when the paradigm is struggling to maintain its prominence 
(Culver & Giudice, 2010). The field of legal ethics is among the many areas of law 
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Firstly, following the Hobbesian principle “auctoritas, non veritas, 
facit legem”, legal positivism basically concentrates on authority, 
whereas the field of legal ethics deals mainly with problems involving 
lawyers and the relationship with their clients. Both lawyers and 
clients are minor figures in the positivist framework. The key ques-
tion for positivism is that of legal validity – and this takes us to the 
quest for the ultimate authority of the legal system that directly or 
indirectly confers legal validity to all other norms (Bobbio, 1993, p. 204). 
The legislator is conceived as an independent authority, and the judge 
as a dependent authority, whereas the lawyer has no authority at all 
(La Torre, 2003).5
H.L.A. Hart’s sophisticated version of positivism, as it appears in his 
seminal work The Concept of Law, perfectly illustrates the marginal role 
that lawyers occupy within the positivist framework. Hart finds the 
foundation for any legal system in what he calls the “rule of recognition”. 
Concerning the acceptance of the rule of recognition from the internal 
point of view of the members of a particular society, Hart introduces a 
crucial distinction between officials and the generality of citizens. Even 
if it would be desirable that every single individual internally accepted the 
rule of recognition, Hart sustains that acceptance by officials alone is a 
sufficient requirement for a legal system to exist. Thus, the active accep-
tance by officials “may be split off from the relatively passive matter of 
the ordinary individual acquiescing in the rules by obeying them for his 
part alone” (Hart, 1994, p. 117). Significantly, lawyers engaged in private 
practice are not considered officials (unlike judges, public attorneys or 
other legal professionals endowed with public authority), and as a conse-
quence their internal point of view has no particular relevance in deter-
mining the rule of recognition. This argument is controversial in itself, 
since it may critically undermine the internal consistency of Hart’s the-
ory of law (Luban, 2007). But even leaving jurisprudential considerations 
aside, it is clear that the whole picture downplays the importance of 
practicing lawyers who are not officials. As it has been rightly pointed 
affected by this ongoing transformation (Holmes & Rice, 2011). It is important 
to bear this point in mind, although I will not develop it further in this paper.
5 This is, of course, a very general and simplified view of positivism. In particular, 
it does not consider the positivist school of American legal realism, that places the 
judge, rather than the legislator, at the centre of the system (see generally, Summers, 
1982).
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out, within this framework it is “embarrassing” to find an adequate role 
for the private lawyer (La Torre, 2009, p. 18).
The second reason why positivism contributes to the amorality theo-
ry concerns the most basic positivist thesis, namely, the separation between 
law and morals. In strict terms, the separation thesis implies that moral 
arguments are extra-legal, and as a consequence, fall beyond the category 
of law and legal reasoning. As said before, the key question for positivism 
is that of normative validity, and this must be ascertained by a sort of 
formal deductive reasoning once the official authority has been established. 
Contrarily to natural law theories, positivism claims that moral reasoning 
does not play any necessary role in this process.
An obvious follow-up of the separation thesis is that the ethical dilem-
mas of lawyers are seen as a confrontation between legal and non-legal (or 
extra-legal) considerations (Simon, 1998). Thus, the advocates for the 
standard conception would conceive the typical lawyers’ dilemma as a clash 
between a clear legal duty to zealously defend the client’s interests against 
some sort of moral consideration on the part of the lawyer that could 
hinder the defence. In other words, the ethical problem is not seen as an 
internal issue within the framework of legal professionalism, but as an 
external confrontation of law and morals. This typically positivist manner 
of wording the problem has important consequences. Following Simon:
The psychological effect of this privileging is to reinforce lawyers’ commit-
ment to conventional responses – client loyalty in all cases where the client’s 
projects are not prohibited by the positive law, obedience to the positive law 
in other cases. Typically, the conventional response is portrayed as the “legal” 
one, and competing ones are “moral” alternatives. The rhetoric connotes that 
the “legal” option is objective and integral to the professional role, while the 
moral option is subjective and peripheral. Even when rhetoric expresses respect 
for the “moral” alternative, it implies that any lawyer adopting it is on his or 
her own and therefore vulnerable both intellectually and practically. The 
usual effect is that it becomes psychologically harder for lawyers and law students 
to argue for the “moral” alternative. (Simon, 1998, pp. 102-03)
This characterisation of legal ethical dilemmas along positivist lines 
reinforces the amorality theory and the morally neutral role that lawyers 
are expected to play. Of course, this view does not rule out the possibil-
ity of extra-legal moral considerations prevailing in a particular case, es-
pecially when disregarding such considerations may seem particularly 
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unacceptable. But in this exceptional case, the lawyer would behave as a 
conscientious objector rather than as a good lawyer. A justification for 
such a position could be at hand depending on the circumstances, and 
the lawyer might reasonably “become a civil disobedient to profes-
sional rules” (Luban, 2007, p. 63). But this leaves the criterion of 
moral neutrality that – according to the standard conception – defines a 
good lawyer untouched.
On the other hand, some amongst the most important critics of amo-
rality sustain that ethical dilemmas should be articulated in intra-legal 
terms; that is, as law vs. law problems (Simon, 1998). According to this 
view, the stereotypical deontological conflict does not confront legal du-
ties with extra-legal moral considerations, but different interpretations of 
what the law demands from the lawyer as a professional in every par-
ticular case. From an ethical point of view, the lawyer must “interpret 
the law, assert his position, plan transactions, and advise clients on the 
basis of arguments that are internal to law” (Wendel, 2010, p. 71). Sig-
nificantly enough, both Simon and Wendel state that this way of looking 
at matters implies not following a strictly positivist theory of law; or, at 
the very least, following an inclusive rather than an exclusive version of 
legal positivism that accepts including moral considerations when ascer-
taining the applicable law to the client’s situation (Wendel, 2005b).
As a summary of this section, we can say that legal positivism neglects 
the discipline of legal ethics both because it concerns lawyers (whereas 
positivism concentrates on authorities) and because it concerns ethics 
(whereas positivism leaves moral matters aside).
THE ADVERSARIAL CONTEXT
As described in the first section, the amorality theory sticks to an 
adversarial view of law. In its most basic formulation, it is the distribution 
of tasks between attorneys and judges that justifies the former’s moral 
neutrality. It is claimed that in this particular institutional context, mor-
ally neutral partisanship works best in discovering truth and finding a fair 
legal outcome (Kipnis, 1991). But there are at least two ways in which 
this approach to adversarialism is problematic in itself.
Firstly, there is the well-known distinction in comparative law between 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems. Broadly speaking, the difference 
concerns the extent to which the judge can play an active role in guiding 
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the parties throughout the process. In the adversarial systems, basically 
those of Anglo-Saxon origin and especially the American system, the 
judge is generally expected to play a rather passive role, with the respon-
sibility for developing the factual and legal records lying on the shoulders 
of litigants. Contrarily, in the inquisitorial systems, typically those 
within the area of influence of continental European legal cultures, the 
judge plays a much more proactive role managing the process and con-
tributing to develop the factual and legal records.
According to some commentators, these two broad sets of systems, 
or legal families, correspond to each of the two sides of the perpetual 
dilemma that lawyers face: the adversarial system privileges the interest 
of the client and favours moral neutrality, whereas the lawyer participat-
ing in the inquisitorial process is more concerned with the general inter-
est of the system (La Torre, 2003). If this is accepted, the success of the 
amorality theory could be simply explained by means of academic sociol-
ogy: most of the literature in the field of legal ethics is published in 
English-speaking countries, and as a consequence it is biased towards the 
system that more naturally accommodates amorality.
This contrast should be born in mind even though we must avoid 
undue generalisations, I believe that the difference between adversarial 
and inquisitorial systems is frequently overstated, at least for the pur-
poses of legal ethics. The justification of amorality does not draw so much 
on the adversarial system but on the adversarial context – meaning the 
situation in which conflicts are dealt with by a process in which two par-
ties confront their positions and leave the decision to an impartial judge 
or arbiter. The crucial elements here are: i) the existence of a structural 
separation between decision makers and attorneys; and ii) attorneys serve 
and defend rather than judge their clients’ causes. Since these two features 
are generally present both in adversarial and inquisitorial systems, it can 
be affirmed that “most legal systems require lawyers to display some 
measure of adversarialism in the sense required by the problems of legal 
ethics” (Markovits, 2008, p. 14). In particular, “lawyers in inquisitorial 
systems generally, are ... subject to the ethical complexities and uncertain-
ties that adversarialism involves” (Markovits, 2008, p. 15). It partially 
seems to be a basic feature of attorneys at-law everywhere, and with it 
comes moral neutrality, according to the standard conception.
The second problem of adversarialism, and in my view a much more 
decisive problem, concerns the fact that most legal work happens out-
side the courtroom, and in many cases is neither directly nor indi-
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rectly related to an adversarial context. Many attorneys, if not most, 
play more often the role of lawyers-as-advisers than that of trial lawyers 
(Luban, 2007). This tendency is only increasing in the current process 
of globalisation, especially for those private lawyers working in fields 
related to multinational companies and global economy (Holmes & 
Rice, 2011).
The consequences for the amorality theory are impossible to overes-
timate. Since this theory finds the ultimate ethical justification for the 
amoral lawyer in its contribution to reaching better judicial decisions, 
“we must bear in mind how atypical and unrepresentative judicial deci-
sions are as legal events” (Luban, 2007, p. 146). As David Luban clearly 
illustrates using the litigation pyramid, only a minor number of conflicts 
actually result in judicial decisions. And, still more important law-suits 
themselves are atypical legal events. “[A] great deal of legal work has 
little or nothing to do with law-suits”, and in fact, “the most basic activ-
ity in the legal system [is] the consultation between lawyer and client, in 
which the client sketches out a problem and the lawyer renders advice” 
(Luban, 2007, pp. 151-52).
This observation has devastating effects for the standard conception, 
since it suggests that its justification is very narrow in scope. This does not 
constitute an attack on the internal consistency of the theory, but it dra-
matically questions its adequacy to tackle the real problems that lawyers 
typically encounter during their daily practice. Significantly enough regard-
ing the legal activity that is adversarial par excellence, namely, criminal 
defence, there is unanimous agreement on the merits of amorality, even 
among its fiercest critics (Luban, 2007; but cf. Simon 1998). Thus, the 
problem does not seem to be amorality per se, but the range of profes-
sional actions that it aims to justify. By focusing on the adversarial context, 
mainstream legal ethics literature formulates conditions that are not pres-
ent when lawyers act as advisers or consultants or transactional agents – 
conditions such as “an impartial referee, orderly procedures, rules for 
obtaining, introducing, and excluding evidence, and a competent opposing 
party”. In such circumstances, “one wonders why anyone has ever thought 
to correlate the role of a lawyer from one context [adversarial] to the 
other [lawyer-as-adviser]” (Wendel, 2005a, p. 1182).
In short, the standard conception has taken the exception as the rule. 
Crucially, some of the most dramatic examples of legal ethical failure in 
recent times, such as the Enron scandal (Cramton, 2002) or the “torture 
memos” (Markovic, 2007), concern lawyers working as advisers to their 
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clients. Unfortunately, a deontological theory based on litigation does 
not shed much light on the behaviour of the lawyers involved.
THE AGENCY MODEL
The third element that contributes to the success of the amorality 
theory is the conception of the relationship between lawyer and client as 
an agency relationship. The success of the agency theory in the field of 
legal services is hardly surprising considering the appeal that this theory 
has held among academics, especially in the United States. Although it 
has been mostly used in the fields of economics and political science, the 
advocates of this theory suggest that its explanatory power is broader, 
and that it can be used to account for many other dimensions of human 
and social life (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985). In particular, the lawyer-client 
relationship is an attractive “target” for the agency model because of the 
knowledge and information asymmetry between the two parties – given 
the complexities of the legal system and the lawyer’s specific training and 
expertise. To acquire free and equal access to law, ordinary people need 
lawyers, who thus become a necessary condition for the very concept of 
citizenship (Pepper, 1986). Following this line of thought, clients should 
be viewed as principals, whereas lawyers must adhere to a set of ethical 
standards that qualify them as legitimate agents.6
The image of the lawyer-as-an-agent points towards an instrumentalist 
view of the profession. This way of looking at things is closely connected 
with the amorality theory, inasmuch as the theory claims that it is the 
client who bears moral responsibility and uses the lawyer as he/she 
pleases. Consistently with this paradigm, lawyers have often been described 
as “hired guns” for their clients (e.g., O’Dair, 2001, p. 326). By the same 
token, it becomes very difficult to articulate lawyers’ responsibilities to-
ward third parties or the system itself (Zacharias, 2007). Unedifying as 
this instrumental view may be from a deontological point of view, it has 
the practical virtue of creating an ethical comfort zone for the lawyer that 
leads to an “anaesthetization of moral conscience” (Nicolson & Webb, 
1999, p. 224). In this way, the private attorney “comes to inhabit a sim-
6 Although the very need of such standards has been the object of debate “due to 
its tendency to “exclude” some professions or to mark them as separate from important 
lay expertise and service” (Menkel-Meadow, 2009, p. 196).
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plified and strikingly amoral universe which regards those factors that 
nonprofessional citizens might believe important, if not decisive, in their 
everyday lives as morally irrelevant.” (Wasserstrom, 1976, p. 8).
Unsurprisingly, critics of amorality are also eager to emphasise the 
limits of the agency model as a metaphor for the lawyer-client relationship. 
Thus, for example, Wendel sustains a strictly limited version of the agency 
relationship, where the lawyer acts as an agent to defend the clients’ legal 
entitlements, but not (as the standard conception claims) the client’s inter-
ests. In other words, lawyers as agents cannot do whatever the client wants 
them to do.7 On the contrary, “the lawyer-client relationship is created by 
the legal system for a particular purpose, which is to enable clients to receive 
the expert assistance they need in order to determine their legal rights and 
duties” (Wendel, 2010, p. 52). Strict respect for that particular purpose is 
what actually justifies this sort of agency relationship; otherwise, there would 
not be much difference between being a legal agent and being the counsellor 
of a criminal gang. Wendel states the problem in strong terms:
Lawyers may lawfully do for their clients only what their clients lawfully 
may do... This is such an obvious point that it is hard to understand why 
lawyers sometimes fail to appreciate it. But it may be the most pervasive feature 
of the normative framework of practicing lawyers that they proclaim an obli-
gation to defend their clients’ interests within the law, rather than vindicating 
their clients’ legal entitlements (Wendel, 2010, p. 59).
In practical terms, the key difference between vindicating clients’ legal 
entitlements and merely defending their interests is that in the latter case 
the law is seen as just an instrument that can be manipulated in order to 
serve those interests; whereas in the former case, the lawyer owes a 
broader obligation of “fidelity towards the law”. Following this contrast, 
Wendel’s anti-instrumentalist position is better described in his own words:
The obligation of respect means that lawyers must treat the law as a reason 
for action as such, not merely a possible downside to be taken into account, 
planned around, or nullified in some way. This obligation applies even if it 
would be very much in the client’s interests to obtain a result that is not sup-
ported by a plausible claim to a legal entitlement (Wendel, 2010, p. 49).
7 As the classic US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote: “Advise the cli-
ent what he should have – not what he wants” (quoted in Luban, 1988, p. 148).
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According to this conception, the lawyer-agent does not owe loyalty 
only to the client. On the contrary, lawyers owe a sort of dual-loyalty to 
their client and to the law, which must be respected and honoured in its 
own right.
This idea of dual-loyalty is especially relevant outside the courtroom, 
where the lawyer acts as an adviser and there is no opposing party vigor-
ously defending a different interpretation of the law. This aspect is crucial 
since, as mentioned in the previous section, most legal activity takes place 
in the lawyers office (rather than the courtroom) with the lawyer acting 
as an adviser to the client (rather than as a litigator). In their advising 
capacity, lawyers occupy a very different role from litigators; and should 
be viewed as “independent intermediaries between private and public 
interests” (Luban, 2007, p. 159).8 Although this view does not necessar-
ily discredit the agency model per se, it obviously points towards a very 
limited and balanced version, somewhere between the two extremes of 
the perpetual dilemma that was described at the beginning of this paper: 
the interest of the client, on the one side, and the general interest of the 
system, on the other. Thus conceived, the role of the lawyers appears as 
“an amalgam of the judges’ and clients’ roles, serving as a bridge between 
the biased position of the client and the ideally neutral position of the 
judge” (Wendel, 2005a, p. 1177).
Other metaphors have been suggested to describe the lawyer-client 
relationship, such as the lawyer-as-a-friend (Fried, 1976), or the 
lawyer-as-a-mirror (La Torre, 2003), but none seems to be strictly 
compatible with the amoral role. In fact, some of the advocates for 
amorality have acknowledged the importance of establishing a moral 
dialogue between lawyer and client, and this necessarily falls beyond 
lawyers’ professional duties as narrowly defined by the standard con-
ception (Pepper, 1986).
In one way or another, all of these alternatives to the merely instru-
mental view of the lawyer-as-an-agent have something in common: they 
place the professionals in a much more uncomfortable ethical position 
8 In this respect, it is relevant that social scientific evidence rejects the idea that 
ordinary people tend to have an instrumentalist view of law that they try to “impose” 
on their lawyers. It would seem to be completely the opposite, since “there is a great 
deal of evidence that citizens believe themselves to be constrained to comply with the 
law”, and it is in fact lawyers who tend to infuse an instrumentalist attitude on clients 
(Wendel, 2010, p. 64; the problem was already identified by Pepper [1986]).
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than they occupied under the amoral role. Rather than inhabiting a 
“simplified moral universe”, as amorality purports, “lawyers actually 
inhabit a world of demanding ethical obligations” (Wendel, 2010, p. 49) 
in which “they are not entitled to abate their own moral conscience by 
arguing that the pursuit of this role is a moral act in itself” (Nicolson & 
Webb, 1999, p. 213). Although humans tend to believe otherwise, there 
is no direct connection between comfort and righteousness, and it must 
be admitted that “the neutral partisanship paradigm can be used to ratio-
nalize unethical decisions” (Holmes & Rice, 2011, p. 73). In short, the 
ethical comfort zone vanishes, and lawyers are faced with the moral 
implications of their social task.
CONCLUSION
Although it may sound paradoxical in its own terms, the theory of 
amorality is the standard conception of legal ethics, and cannot be read-
ily dismissed. In particular, its success can be explained by three elements 
that are present to a greater or lesser extent in all Western legal cultures: 
state-centred positivism as the controlling paradigm in legal thinking; an 
emphasis on the adversarial context; and the perception of the lawyer-
client relationship through the lenses of the agency model.
Besides describing the standard conception and identifying its ex-
planatory factors, this paper has pursued a more critical aim. The theo-
ry of amorality appears limited and problematic, since all three above 
mentioned elements have crucial problems of their own. Firstly, and 
without going further into jurisprudential debates, the process of glo-
balisation and concomitant mutations in the traditional conception of 
state sovereignty are severely affecting state-centred legal positivism, 
which is struggling to maintain its position as a dominant paradigm. 
Secondly, in popular belief adversarial confrontation in court arguably 
constitutes the hard-core of the legal profession, but in empirical terms 
it represents only a minor part of the various ways in which lawyers 
serve their clients. Finally, the agency model, successful as it has been in 
other fields of social sciences, points towards a merely instrumentalist 
view of the legal profession, and ultimately of the law, something which 
has been sharply and often criticised.
All these problems highlight the limits and weaknesses of the theory 
of amorality as the dominant conception of legal ethics. The criticisms 
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that have been reviewed in the previous sections suggest different alterna-
tives to the model of the amoral lawyer. A more complex, more diverse, 
more pluralistic, and less monolithic theory is gradually taking shape. In 
my view, though, the final form will depend on the broader debate taking 
place at the level of general jurisprudence. The obvious struggle of state-
centred positivism to keep its prominence is crucial for the discussion of 
legal ethics, and at the same time, legal ethics can contribute decisively to 
that debate by combining the most philosophical with the most prag-
matic dimensions of law. Now is the time for an active cooperation be-
tween the increasingly fashionable field of legal ethics and the ancient and 
respected discipline of legal philosophy.
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